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Summary
The terrorist attacks of September 11 resulted in the largest insured catastrophic
loss in history, estimated to total $40 billion.  Even though the insurance industry
committed to pay losses resulting from the attacks, industry spokesmen asserted that
insurers might not be able to cover major future terrorism losses without a federal
backstop.  The 107th Congress considered how to provide such a backstop. 
On November 29, 2001, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3210, the
Terrorism Risk Protection Act, providing for a temporary federal backstop.  In the
Senate, four similar measures were introduced in 2001, but no action was taken during
the first session of the 107th Congress.  On June 7, 2002, Senators Dodd, Sarbanes,
Schumer, and Reid introduced a compromise proposal, S. 2600, which was passed by
the Senate on June 18, 2002.  On October 17, 2002, leaders of the House-Senate
conference committee and the White House tentatively agreed in principle upon a
proposed compromise version of the legislation, which was circulated to all conferees
for signatures.  The conferees approved the conference report, which was filed
November 13.  The House agreed to the report by voice vote on November 14, and the
Senate by vote of 86-11, on November 19.  The President signed the bill, which became
P.L. 107-297, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, on November 26, 2002.
This report records the legislative development of H.R. 3210, S. 2600, and the
conference report language enacted as P.L. 107-297.  It will not be updated further.  For
further information, please call Rawle King (707-5975), or Barbara Miles (707-7804).
Background
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in the largest insured
catastrophic loss in history, estimated to total $40 billion.  At the time, the insurance
industry committed to pay losses resulting from the attacks and not invoke “act of war”
clauses, even though there had been considerable discussion that such an invocation might
be appropriate.  Despite the magnitude of the projected losses, the solvency of the
insurance industry and most insurance firms was not seriously threatened, in part because
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of the spreading of losses among many secondary insurers through the industry practice
of “reinsurance.” 
In light of the huge “9/11” losses and because of the lack of any actuarial basis for
determining loss exposures, however, many reinsurers indicated an unwillingness to
accept the risk of loss from terrorism in the future.  In turn, industry spokesmen asserted
that in view of the impending difficulty in obtaining reinsurance for the risk of future
terrorist attacks, primary insurers would not be able to cover future terrorism losses
without some form of federal backstop.  There were anecdotal accounts of dramatically
increased premiums or outright inability of some businesses and major real estate
landmarks to get insurance that included coverage for acts of terrorism.  Several proposals
for a federal backstop were introduced in Congress in 2001, and one – H.R. 3210 – passed
the House on November 29, 2001.  On April 24, 2002, a unanimous consent agreement
was proposed to bring H.R. 3210 to the Senate floor and amend it by substituting the
language of the compromise agreed to by Banking Committee members, Senators Dodd,
Sarbanes, and Gramm.  Efforts to reach agreement were not successful, and on June 7,
2002, Senators Dodd, Sarbanes, Schumer, and Reid introduced the compromise proposal
as a separate bill (S. 2600), which was passed by the Senate on June 18, 2002.  On
October 17, 2002, leaders of the House-Senate conference committee and White House
officials agreed in principle upon a proposed version of the legislation, which was
circulated to all conferees for signatures.  The conferees approved and filed the conference
report on November 13, and its language was subsequently passed by the House on
November 14, and the Senate (86-11) November 19.  On November 26, the bill was
signed by the President and enacted as P.L.107-297.     
Comparison of H.R. 3210, S. 2600, and Conference Report (P.L.
107-297) 
The House, Senate, and conference report language were similar in several aspects,
such as by establishing a temporary backstop program, providing for oversight by the U.S.
Treasury, setting triggers (losses sufficient to bring the federal backstop into play), setting
definitions of what constitutes a terrorism event, and preempting state laws.  They differed
with respect to whether or not assistance must be repaid, the nature of legal modifications
and limitations, and other specific details. 
Key provisions, similarities, and differences are set out in the following chart.
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